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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 970100-CA

Plaintiff,
vs.

Priority No. 2
VASSDLIOS CHALKIDIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

PRIFFFOR APPFIMNT
STATEMENT OF JTHUSmCTION
This is an appeal from a conviction of Distribution of a Controlled Substance within a 1000
feet of a park, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(5) (1995), in the
Second Judicial District Court, the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, presiding.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction is this as it is an appeal from a criminal case
involving a first degree felony. Utah Code Ann.§78-2-2(3)(I) (1995). This court was assigned
jurisdiction by the Supreme Court when they declined to hear this matter.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

This first issue comprises really two distinct issues: one of statutory interpretation, which

in the present case is a case of first impression, and whether in light of that statutory interpretation
did the trial court commit plain error in submitting the issue to the jury, in that, there was no
evidence adduced at trial to establish that the park in question was "public".
2.

The second issue is whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury in the definitions

of public over defense counsel's objections.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

The first issue is in fact two issues: The threshold issue of statutory interpretation,

which this court will decide as a matter of law, State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1316-17 (Utah
App. 1993); and the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. This Court
will "review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah 1992). Under this
standard, this Court will only reverse a conviction when the evidence, viewed in light of its
interpretation of the statute, "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he
i

[or she] was convicted." Id2.

This Court will review the trial court's instructions to the jury for correctness,

affording no deference. Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993). When conducting this
analysis, this Court will review the instructions in their entirety to determine whether the instructions,
when considered as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law. Id. This Court will "
reverse a trial court's decision on the basis of an instruction improperly submitted to the jury only
where the party challenging the propriety of the instruction 'demonstrates prejudice stemming from
the instructions viewed in the aggregate.'" Id. (quoting State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah
App.l991),revU on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993)).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES AND PROPRIETY OF REVIEW
The first issue of statutory interpretation and sufficiency of the evidence was not preserved
at trial level.

An appellate court may address an issue for the first time on appeal if Appellant
2

establishes that the trial court committed "plain error," State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09
(Utah 1993), The record will reveaJ that the trial court committed plain error in allowing the jury
to consider the first degree felony of distribution of a controlled substance within a 1000 feet of
a public park when there was no evidence presented to show that the park in this case was
"public/' Accordingly, the review is proper because the trial record is adequate to determine this
issue and counsel intends to argue that all three factors have been met.
2.

Appellant/Defendant's trial counsel properly made objections to the State's

proposed jury instructions and also made a record for the basis of those objections.
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The Appellant identifies the following constitutional provision, statutes, ordinances and
rules as those "whose interpretation is determinative" within the meaning of Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(6):
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(5) (1995):
(5) Prohibited acts E~Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter
37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled
Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed:
(I) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any
of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary institution or on the
3

grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
I
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds
which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through
a school or institution under Subsections (5)(a)(I) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
i

(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house,
playhouse,
or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections
(5)(a)(I) through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act occurs,
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be
imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have
been established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition
or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been served.
° If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less
than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a person convicted under this subsection
is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
4

(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the actor mistakenly
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the
location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware
at the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a).
Utah Code Annotated §76-10-1301(1995):
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "House of prostitution" means a place where prostitution or promotion of prostitution
is regularly carried on by one or more persons under the control, management, or
supervision of another.
(2) "Inmate" means a person who engages in prostitution in or through the agency of a
house of prostitution.
(3) "Public place" means any place to which the public or any substantial group of the
public has access.
(4) "Sexual activity" means acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any sexual act
involving the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person, regardless
of the sex of either participant.
Utah Code Annotated §76-9-102(2) (1995):
Disorderly Conduct:
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:
(a) He refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to move from a public
place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition, by any
5

act which serves no legitimate purpose; or
(b) Intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly
creating a risk thereof:
(I) He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior;
or
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a public place; or
(iii) He makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be heard
in a public place; or
(iv) He engages in abusive or obscene language or makes obscene gestures
in a public place; or
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic.
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any place to which the
public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes but is not limited to
streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office
buildings, transport facilities, and shops.
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense continues after a request
by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an infraction.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Chalkidis was charged by Amended Information with Distribution of a Controlled
Substance within a 1000 feet of a school, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) and 1(b)(1) (1995).

6

DISPOSITION yiy TRIAL COURT
Chalkidis was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of five years to life on the first
degree felony. A disposition hearing was set at the time of sentencing in which Chalkidis pleaded
guilty to two other second degree felony distributions. He was sentenced to two indeterminate
prison terms of one year to fifteen on each second degree felony with these felonies running
concurrent with the sentence on the first degree felony. This appeal then followed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the light most favorable to the jury verdict1, the State claims that in North Ogden, Utah,
Chalkidis distributed cocaine to a confidential informant by the name of Simon Trujillo. The
amount distributed was established at trial to be around 2.5 ounces cocaine. Initially, the State
charged Chalkidis with a second degree felony but later amended their Information to a first
degree felony alleging that the park across the street from the Chalkidis home, which is located
in Lake View Heights subdivision, was a public park.
The State called one witness to establish the element of a "public" park; Detective
Crowther of the North Ogden City Police. Detective Crowther testified at length as to the location
of the park within a private subdivision, its characteristics, the presence of signs identifying the
private nature of the park and its restricted use by Lake View Heights Association Members.
Nowhere within the testimony of Officer Crowther did he ever testify that the park in question was
public.
Trial counsel called Lori Wedde to testify as past member of the Lake View Heights

1

See State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1992).
7

Association and to nature and characteristics of the park. Wedde testified that about the exclusive
nature of the Lake View subdivision, the restrictive access to the park and in general the
population of Lake View Heights as compared to that of North Ogden.
At the close of trial counsel's case in chief, both the State, trial counsel and the judge
retired to the court's chambers for final discussions on proposed jury instructions, while in
chambers the trial court overruled trial counsel's objections to the State's proposed jury instruction
on the definition of "public" as well as allowed the State to amend the Information to include the
lesser included offense of Distribution of Controlled Substance, second degree felony. Trial
counsel requested on the record to make known his objections to proposed jury instructions and
the inclusion of the lesser included offense. At that time, the trial court made known its concerns
about sending to the jury the issue of first degree felony.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court committed plain error by not sua sponte refusing to submit to the jury the
issue of the whether Chalkidis had distributed cocaine within a 1000 feet of a public park when
the court was cogently aware that no evidence in the form of testimony was presented to establish
the element of "public."
The trial court erred in submitting jury instructions drawn from other criminal statutes
when each and every statute contained language which would limit the use of those statutory
definitions to that statute only.

Moreover, the instruction that was submitted to the jury

incorrectly stated the law regarding the definition of "public".

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY SUBMITTING TO
THE JURY THE ISSUE OF THE FIRST DEGREE FELONY
DISTRIBUTION WITHIN A 1000 FEET OF A PUBLIC PARK WHEN
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PARK WAS
"PUBLIC".
This argument comprises really two distinct issues: one of statutory interpretation, which
in the present case is a case of first impression, and whether in light of that statutory interpretation
did the trial court commit plain error in submitting the issue to the jury, in that, there was no
evidence adduced at trial to establish that the park in question was "public". In State v. Gibson.
908 P.2d 352 (Utah App. 1995), that court found that "[w]hen examining the sufficiency of the
evidence in a criminal jury trial, we begin with the threshold issue of statutory interpretation,
which we decide as a matter of law." Id. at 355; $£& State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1316-17
(Utah App. 1993). As to sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must review "the evidence and
all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict
of the jury." Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, 355 (quoting State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah
1992).

This Court may only reverse a conviction when "the evidence, viewed in light of our

interpretation of the statute, 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he [or she] was convicted.'" M. (quoting Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1156). In addition to the
aforementioned analysis, this Court upon finding that its interpretation of "public" was not
supported by the evidence, it must then consider whether the error to submit the issue to jury
9

constituted plain error.
A.
A PRIVATELY OWNED PARK IS NOT A PUBLIC PARK UNDER EITHER A "PLAIN
LANGUAGE" INTERPRETATION OR AS INTERPRETED IN THE LIMITED CASELAW IN
THIS STATE.
There is no question that the area directly across from the Chalkidis' residence is a park.
What is at issue is whether this private park constitutes a "public" park under Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-8(5)(v) (1995). Unfortunately, the Legislature did not define "public" within the Utah
Controlled Substances Act (hereinafter "Act"). Appellant contends that the trial court was
misguided in looking to other areas of the code for a definition. If there is some question as to
what was the legislative intent when the Legislature used the word "public" this Court must look
to the "plain meaning" of that word to determine its definition.

In construing legislative

enactments, this Court must "give effect to the Legislature's underlying intent." West Jordan v.
Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). "Generally, the best indication of that intent is the
statute's plain language."

Perrine v. Kennecott Mtn. Corp.: 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah

1996)(citing Berube v. Fashion Centre.Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). This Court should
"interpret a statute according to its plain language, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused,
inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of the statute." Id. at 1292.
Under Perrine and Berube this court must interpret "public" park according to its plain
language or meaning. In Perrine. the Utah Supreme Court was confronted with a statute similar
to the one at issue in that the Landowner Liability Act also did not define "public". The Perrine
court found that the "term 'public' ... connotes 'an unexclusive group of persons." 911 P.2d
1290, 1292 (quoting 73 C.J.S. Public (1983)). The court further found that "'Public' has been
defined as 'the whole body of people' and '[o]pen to all; ...open to common use ... not limited
10

or restricted to any particular class of the community." Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1393
(4th ed. 1951).2

For the Perrine court it is clear that "public" has a plain meaning and it is not

inconsistent with the general use of the term "public". The Perrine interpretation of "public"
would not include a private park contained wholly within a private subdivision.
B.
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL IN LIGHT OF THE PERRINE INTERPRETATION
OF "PUBLIC" WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PARK ACROSS FROM
THE CHALKIDIS' RESIDENCE WAS A "PUBLIC" PARK.
A jury verdict will be reversed in a criminal case when as a matter of law the evidence was
insufficient to warrant conviction. State v. Harman. 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App.1989).
"Nevertheless, the standard for reversal is high." State v. Smith. 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App.
1996). A reversal is also warranted if the evidence is so " 'inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime.' n Harman. 767 P.2d 567, 568 (quoting State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983));
accord State v. Bradley. 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985). This Court "must review from a
perspective most favorable to the verdict that the evidence and all inferences reasonably drawn

2

The Perrine court went on to cite numerous authorities supporting its interpretation of
"public". Public has been defined as open to all and "not limited to any particular group."
See, e.g. Citv of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R R. 41 I11.2d 245, 242 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1968)
("public" used to describe a bridge, means that the public generally has free and unrestricted
rights to use it); Gradison v. Ohio Oil Co.. 239 Ind. 218, 156 N.E.2d 80, 86 (1959) ("public,"
as used in condemnation provision limiting eminent domain power for public use, means the
public has right to use the condemned property without discrimination); Lander v. Village of
South Orange. 58 N.J. 509, 279 A.2d 633, 639 (1971)("public," as used in deed requiring that
land be used as a public park, means open to all); City of Lakewood v. Thornmeyer. 154 N.E.2d
77, 791 (Ohio C.P. 1958)("public," as used in condemnation provision limiting eminent domain
power for public use, means the whole body of mankind)(citations omitted); Frawley Ranches,
Inc. v. Lasher. 270 N.W. 2d 366, 369 (S.D. 1978) (right of way is "public" if everyone who
desires may lawfully use it).
11

from the evidence, recognizing that determinations regarding witness credibility are solely within
the jury's province." Smith. 927 P.2d 649, 651. "To affirm the jury's verdict, we must be sure
the State has introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." M.
"An Appellant raising issues of fact on appeal must ... marshal all the evidence supporting the
trial court's findings and then show that evidence to be insufficient" when viewed in the light most
favorable to the decision. State v. DrobeL 815 P.2d 724, 734-735 (Utah App.) cert, denied. 836
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991).
1.

Marshaling the evidence

For purposes of this argument, Appellant will concede that all other elements of the first
degree felony Distribution of a Controlled Substance within in a 1000 feet of a public park were
established save one: that the park was "public". The State called one witness, Detective Clark
Crowther, of the North Ogden City Police, to establish the element of a "public park". The
Appellant called Detective Crowther and Lori Wedde to establish that the park in question is
private.
The following evidence adduced in the State's case in chief would support the finding that
the park is public: 1. Crowther testified that Lake View Heights is "an association that is within
the limits of North Ogden City — homeowner's association." Crowther Testimony (hereinafter
known as CT) CT13 at 9, 10; 2. When describing the park across from the Chalkidis' residence
he states "It has a small area of children playground equipment: a swing set, tires, sand. There's
a small gazebo-type structure, picnic tables in it, and some tennis courts, and then some grassy
areas with trees." CT 14 at 5-9; When asked about whether the park is "open to everybody?" CT
^4 at 24, Crowther replies, "It's a park that belongs to Lake View Heights Association." CT ^4
12

at 25, 15 at 1; When asked uAs far as you know, every member of this homeowner's association
has access to that park; is that correct?" CT 15 at 14-16, Crowther replies "Yes" CT 15 at 17.
The foregoing replies constitute all evidence of "publicness" presented by the State in its case in
chief.
2.

Insufficiency of the Marshaled Evidence

The aforementioned evidence when analyzed in light of the Perrine court's definition of
what "public" is does not establish that the park in question was "public". In review of those
elements the Court found to be dispositive of "publicness" were the following characteristics:
"unexclusive"3; "the whole body of people"; "[o]pen to all; ...open to common use ... not limited
or restricted to any particular class of the community"4, and "not limited to any particular group"5
none of following characteristics could be adduced from Detective Crowther's testimony.
In support of Appellant's argument that the direct testimony of Detective Crowther instead
establishes the private nature of the park, Appellant offers the following examples: Crowther
testifies to its limited access, See CT 15 at 14-17; its limited ownership See CT 15 at 2-4; and
restrictive designation (signs at entrances indicate "private property"), See CT 15 at 12. Nothing
said by Crowther during the whole of his testimony even comes close to the definition of "public"
as enunciated in Perrine.

3

911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (quoting 73 C.J.S. Public (1983))

4

ld. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1393 (4th ed. 1951).

5

Perrine. 911 P.2d 1290, 1294. See, £ ^ City of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R.R.. 41
111.2d 245, 242 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1968) ("public" bridge means that the public has free and
unlimited access).
13

On cross-examination, Crowther further establishes the clearly private nature of the park.
He believes that about an "eighth", CT 16 at 21, of the population of North Ogden City lives in
Lake View Estates, that no "public" functions are held at the park, CT 16 at 7-10, and no
"fireworks displays that the rest of North Ogden City" participate in CT K6 at 11-13. Appellant's
counsel at trial, posed a hypothetical to Detective Crowther which demonstrated the exclusive and
restrictive nature of the park, in that, a resident could have a non-resident arrest for trespass for
just being on the premises. Sfi£ CT 16 at 14-25.
In the present case, the State's only witness never even uttered the word "public"
throughout all of his responses. It is fair to characterize the evidence in the State's case in chief
as being completely devoid of any indicia which would qualify the park as "public". Under
Harman and Smith there is no evidence of the element of "public" park within the State's case in
chief. The evidence of "public" nature of the park across from the Chalkidis' residence is so "
'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime.'" Hatman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (quoting State v.
Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). Even when the evidence that has been marshaled above
in favor of the jury verdict is viewed in light of the Perrine definition of "public" there was
insufficient evidence from which the jury could convict Mr. Chalkidis of a first degree felony
Distribution of a Controlled Substance within a 1000 feet of a public park.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN SUBMITTING THE FIRST
DEGREE FELONY TO THE JURY WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF THE
ELEMENT OF "PUBLIC".
Because this issue was not preserved,at the trial level, this Court will be addressing the
sufficiency of the evidence under the more stricter standard of plain error. It is a well-established
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rule that a defendant who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is generally barred from
raising it for the first time on appeal. State v. Lopez. 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State
v. Archamheau. 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). An appellate court may address an issue
for the first time on appeal if appellant establishes that the trial court committed "plain error,"
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); Archambeau. 820 P.2d at 922. In order
to obtain appellate relief through the doctrine of "plain error," an appellant must establish that "(I)
[a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. If appellant fails to prove one of these requirements, plain
error is not established. M. at 1209.
1.
The trial court in submitting the enhancement issue, within a 1000 feet of a
public park committed error.
The trial court had a chance to hear all the evidence presented by the State regarding the
element of "public". Even under the standard for a motion for a directed verdict, the court should
have sua sponte found that the State had failed to meet its prima facie burden as to the issue of
whether the park was "public" and refused to submit. There was no evidence presented to the
trial court to persuade either the fact finder or the judge that the park opposite to the Chalkidis'
home was a "public" park.
"In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to send a case to the jury, the court
uses the same standard as for a claim of insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict." State v.
Taylor. 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1996).

In Dihello. the defendant appealed a murder

conviction, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to send the case to the jury. State v.
Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). In concluding the trial court did not err, the Dibello
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court noted that appellate courts should "uphold the trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the
evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the court] conclude[s] that some
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. Additionally, the evidence is to be viewed in a light
most favorable to the State. State v. Iverson. 10 Utah 2d 171, 350 P.2d 152, 153 (1960). In
viewing the evidence in this light, if "the jury acting fairly and reasonably could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge is required to submit the case to the jury
for determination of the guilt or innocence of defendant." M. As was argued earlier even with
when all the evidence supporting a finding of "public" is marshaled and viewed in the light most
favorable to the State and the verdict, there is still no evidence that the park across from the
Chalkidis' residence was "public".
2.
The trial court was aware of the Perrine definition of "public" and concluded that in
light of that interpretation that the park in question was private but still submitted the issue to
the jury.
In the transcript entitled, "Objections to Jury Instructions" (hereinafter referred to as OJI),
the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor made known on the record that he believed that the State had
failed to establish that the park was "public". The trial court began discussing a case which it
could not name but sounds factually similar to the Perrine case. The trial court then concluded
that under the Perrine interpretation of "public" it "would almost implicitly make this a private
park as opposed to a public park." OJI V at 11-13.

When the trial court says "this" it is

referring to the park across from the Chalkidis' residence.
The trial court was aware of the problem of submitting to the jury the enhanced first degree
felony based on the fact that the distribution occurred across from a "public" park. During an
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earlier in camera conference prior to charging the jury and prior to the record being made which
is now before this Court, the State moved to amend the Information to include the lesser included
offense of Distribution of Controlled Substance sans the enhancement language to which trial
counsel for Appellant objected on record. It appears that the trial court was confident that the jury
was not going to find the Appellant guilty of the first degree felony but unfortunately for Mr.
Chalkidis they did. See OJI 19 at 1-2. A discussion of whether or not the park is "public" or
"private" took place between trial counsel and the court, in concluding that the discussion, the
trial court states "Well, it's an interesting question. Maybe we won't have to worry about it." OJI
19 at 1-3. The trial court committed obvious error in submitting to the jury an issue which it
knew that the State had not provided any evidence to substantiate.
3.

The error in charging the jury with the information of an enhanced Distribution of

Controlled Substance, a first degree felony, was harmful.
Briefly, the prior arguments and case analysis indicate that the jury should never had heard
the issue of the first degree felony. The State had not produced any evidence that the park in
question was "public" as required by the statute and the Information of which Mr. Chalkidis was
charged. See POINT 1(B)(2). The trial court realized in light of its cursory research that the Utah
Supreme Court in Perrine found the word "public" to be unexclusive, non-restrictive, and open
to all. The trial court knew that at the time it charged the jury with the first degree felony that
there was no evidence that the jury could conclude from that the park was "public". The
Appellant was convicted of an enhanced first degree felony subjecting him to an indeterminate
term of five years to life. The final issue to be analyzed is whether this error was harmful: it is
a fortiori harmful. An error is harmful if, "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of
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a more favorable outcome," or "our confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. Dunn. 850
P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
Had the trial court refused to submit to the jury the first degree felony the jury, in all
likelihood, would have found the Appellant guilty of the second degree felony subjecting him to
an indeterminate term of one year to fifteen years in prison. The harm in this case is the
additional time the Appellant will have to serve because of this plain error.
"The plain error rule permits the appellate court to assure that justice is done, even if
counsel fails to act to bring a harmfully erroneous ruling to the attention of the trial court." State
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989). In conjunction with the requirement of a timely
objection, the plain error rule thus " 'ultimately permit[s] the appellate court to balance the need
for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness.' " M. (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d
116, 122 n. 12 (Utah 1989)). Appellant has established that the error of submitting to the jury the
first degree felony was plain error and this Court should reverse the conviction for the first degree
felony and enter a conviction for the lesser included offense of Distribution of a Controlled
Substance, a second degree felony.
POINT H
ARGUMENT
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CHARGING THE
JURY WITH A DEFINITION OF "PUBLIC" WHICH WAS NOT THE
CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW.
As a general rule, M[n]o party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the ground of his objection."
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Utah R.Crim. P. 19.

In the transcript

provided entitled "Objections to Jury Instructions", trial counsel objected to the trial court
charging the jury with definitions culled from other statutes specifically, Prostitution, Utah Code
Ann. §76-10-1301(1995), and Disorderly Conduct, Utah Code Ann. §76-9-102 (1995). The final
jury instruction on the definition of "public" mirrored the definition of "public" found in 76-9102(2). Trial counsel objected based on that fact the Utah Controlled Substances Act, §58-37-1
et seq. (1995), does not have a definition of "public". See OJI \1 at 5-10. Counsel also
requested that the term "public" is so "common", OJI 12 at 20, that no definition is needed.
The purpose of giving instructions to the jurors is to assist them in understanding the
issues and the elements of the crime for which they have to decide in the case. This Court will
review the trial court's instructions to the jury for correctness, affording no deference. Ames v. Maas.
846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App.1993). When conducting this analysis, this Court will review the
instructions in their entirety to determine whether the instructions, when considered as a whole, fairly
instruct the jury on the applicable law. Id. "The trial court is not required to give any requested
jury instruction if it does not comport with the facts presented or does not accurately state the
applicable law." State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 800 (Utah 1991).
1.

The State's instruction on the definition of "public" did not instruct the jury on the

applicable law.
As already stated, the trial court was aware of the Perrine decision, it knew that the State
had not established the element of "public" through the testimony adduced at trial. Further, the
trial court questioned the soundness of submitting the instructions to the jury when it stated,
"...I'm not completely certain that I've instructed the jury correctly on that issue..." OJI 15 at 1416. The trial court did analyze the problem of using definitions from other criminal statutes when
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those statutes specifically limit the definition of "public" to that particular statute. The trial court
stated that this "section does specifically state that this definition applies to this section, which
would imply that it's not a universal kind of definition." OJI K4 at 15-18. Since these individual
definitions are limited to there particular statute, the correct statement of the law would have been
the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Perrine to instruct the jury on what constitutes "public".
The trial court erred in submitting the State's proposed instruction on the definition of "public".
2.
The error in charging the jury with a definition of "public" which was not the correct
statement of the law was prejudicial or harmful.
A trial court's error is harmful "if absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of an
outcome more favorable to the defendant." State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993);
accord State v. White. 880 P.2d 18, 21 (Utah App.1994). In the instant case, the jury was allowed
to consider as a guide, areas and places that have historically been considered to be private as
constituting what is now "public". Had the jury not been misguided to believe that even private
areas are "public" it is entirely reasonable that they would have returned a verdict of not guilty
on the first degree felony and instead entered a conviction on the lesser included offense, of a
second degree felony, Distribution of a Controlled Substance. This error is reversible in that the
verdict would have been different had the trial refused to instruct with the State's proposed
definition.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF REQUESTED
This Court has the jurisdiction and authority to enter the conviction of the lesser included
offense of Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a second degree felony. Utah appellate courts
may modify criminal convictions and enter judgments of conviction for a lesser included offense
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on appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1995); State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1209-11 (Utah
1993).

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
This is case of first impression regarding the interpretation of the word "public" in the
Utah Controlled Substance Abuse Act it is requested that oral argument be granted to assist this
Court in defining the issues and understanding the determinative law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of April, 1^97.

Michael JTBoyle
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant, this 21st day of April, 1997, to Christine Soltis, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Appeals Division, 160 East 300 South, 6th floor, P.O. BoxJ4£^<3alt L^kerejjy, Utah 841140854.
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Attorney for D6fendan
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